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Much "To-Do" about Nothing 
Hales's Skeptical Relativism, and 
Basic Doxastic Perspectives 
MARKS. McLEoD-HARRISON 
Department of Religious Studies 
George Fox University 
Newburg, Oregon 
Steven Hales's defense of his argument for philosophical relativism 
found in "What to Do about Incommensurable Doxastic Perspectives" chal-
lenges a number of different claims I made in my "Hales's Argument for 
Philosophical Relativism."1 One challenge is that I have misunderstood his 
argument and he thus clarifies his original intention. The second challenge is 
that the Alstonian-inspired alternative I gave simply misses the mark, where-
in Hales chides Alston and me for having our epistemological heads in the 
sand. The third is an attempt to show that a number of my claims, taken to-
gether, lead to a contradiction. In keeping with Hales's sometime literary al-
lusions, I hope to show that Hales response is much "to-do" about nothing. 
In the aforementioned response to my criticism, Hales argues the fol-
lowing. 
(1) There is more than one internally consistent yet basic doxastic 
practice, each of which generates philosophical propositions (and 
hence, knowledge claims). 
(2) The deliverances of these various practices, when compared across 
practices, conflict with one another. 
(3) Without any rational means by which to pick the practice that gen-
erates true beliefs, one's options are to retreat to skepticism about 
philosophical propositions (and the concomitant knowledge claims) 
or move to relativism about philosophical propositions (where what 
is true is relative to doxastic perspective). 
ABSTRACT: Steven Hales's defense of his philosophical relativism in "What to Do about Incom-
mensurable Doxastic Perspectives" challenges a number of my criticisms made in my "Hales's 
Argument for Philosophical Relativism." I respond to each of these challenges and make a 
number of further observations about Hales's position. 
1. See Steven Hales, "What to Do about Incommensurable Doxastic Perspectives," Philoso-
phia Christi 11 (2009): 201-6, and MarkS. McLeod-Harrison, "Hales's Argument for Philo-
sophical Relativism," Philosophia Christi 10 (2008): 411-23. 
(4) Taking the skepticism route leads one to a version of the Knower's 
Paradox (which he takes to be a solution oflast resort). 
(5) Therefore, philosophical propositions are not absolute but relative 
to doxastic perspective. 
While I agree with (l) and (2), I disagree with (3)-anAlstonian approach is 
a third alternative. Nevertheless, in my earlier criticism, I claimed Hales's ar-
gument was that skepticism is self-refuting.2 In fact, I took him to be offering 
two reasons to pick relativism over skepticism, the first being skepticism's 
self-refutation and the second the Knower's Paradox. I had no particular re-
sponse to the Knower's Paradox and therefore said nothing of it. I only took 
up what I thought was his first argument, leaving the Knower's Paradox to 
its own fate. In his reply, Hales denies that he was showing skepticism self-
refuting but that his whole discussion of skepticism was aimed at the conclu-
sion that skepticism leads to a version of the Knower's Paradox. 
But I think there is some good textual evidence that, at the least, his 
book's claims were misleading if, in fact, his discussion was aimed only at 
showing that skepticism leads to the knower's paradox. Consider this claim: 
'The skeptical position looks strong-too strong, as it turns out. The skepti-
cal alternative appears self-defeating, and so skepticism is not a viable re-
sponse to the problems raised so far."3 If that does not claim that skepticism 
is self-refuting, I do not know what would. So unless he means something 
different by self-defeating than self-refuting, it seems the onus is on Hales to 
show that my reading of his text is completely off. 
However, to avoid getting into a philosophical spitting match about who 
said what and when, let us apply the principle of charity. In short, let us al-
low Hales's current expression of his earlier intention stand. Let us allow, in 
fact, that I previously misread his claims. Even if I did, however, much of 
what I said in my earlier criticism still stands. Giving Hales the benefit of 
the doubt, namely, that his intention was to argue not that skepticism is self-
refuting but rather it leads to a version of the Knower's Paradox, I still do 
not see his conclusion. In my "Hales's Argument for Philosophical Relativ-
ism," I raised the question, What does Hales mean by the term "can't" in his 
original schematization of the challenge to skepticism, where he wrote "If 
skepticism about philosophical propositions is true, then we can't know the 
truth of any philosophical proposition. "4 I assumed he meant something like 
"impossible," which, apparently, he did, for that is how he characterizes the 
position in "What to Do about Incommensurable Doxastic Practices." My 
earlier point was not to ignore his characterization but rather to suggest that 
his account of skepticism is not the only legitimate one. While his version 
of skepticism certainly leads to the Knower's Paradox, one cannot just pick 
2. See McLeod-Harrison, "Hales's Argument for Philosophical Relativism," 417-21. 
3. See Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy, 91. 
4. See McLeod-Harrison, "Hales's Argument for Philosophical Relativism," 418, and com-
pare Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy, 92. 
and choose the version of skepticism because it leads to the conclusion one 
wants (namely, the Knower's Paradox, which Hales finds to be "certainly 
not a good thing," thus choosing relativism over skepticism). My point now, 
even granting his goal of understanding skepticism as moving toward the 
Knower's Paradox, is that there is another version of skepticism available 
that sidesteps his whole argument and does not (at least obviously) lead to 
the Knower's Paradox. When skepticism is defined in such a way that knowl-
edge is impossible, then the Knower's Paradox might rear up. But if skepti-
cism simply claims that we do not know but adds that we might not know 
that either, the Knower's Paradox keeps its head down. Thus, sidestepping 
skepticism is not as simple as Hales makes it sound. If my weaker version 
of skepticism remains a viable alternative, Hales's argument for relativism 
simply does not go through, for it seems he would have to respond not just 
where knowledge is impossible but where we simply do not have it, ever, as 
a matter of fact. 
A second issue, newly raised here, is that I think Hales probably oversim-
plifies the Christian doxastic practice and its relationship to "intuition-driven 
analytic rationalism." It is not as if the Christian philosopher does not appeal 
to intuition. Instead the intuitions are just different from her non-Christian 
peers. Of course, she adds revelatory propositions to her intuitive frame-
work. In fact, many of the list of disagreements (at least in the essay under 
consideration) are moral issues, and while the Christian moral philosopher 
may begin with something revealed, she could very likely go on to defend the 
views on more religiously neutral grounds, using the same or similar tools 
as those of the "intuition-driven" philosopher. Further, the breadth of views 
among Christian philosophers is likely much broader than Hales's comments 
suggest. The consensus on issues such as abortion, homosexuality, and eu-
thanasia is far from total, any more than it is among the intuition-driven 
analytic rationalists. It is worth noting that Hales is somewhat inconsistent in 
describing Christians, sometimes appealing to the (Roman) Catholic Church 
and other times more Protestant views. The differences there on moral is-
sues can be quite astounding! When speaking of more metaphysical issues 
(the nature of Jesus's atoning work or that God would require a homicide to 
motivate divine forgiveness), Hales's appeal is likewise to conflicting moral 
intuitions between Christian philosophers and secular ones. So if there is a 
relativism across the two epistemic perspectives, it would probably take a lot 
more sorting out than Hales has done. In short, who appeals to philosophical 
intuition and when and where it is used is likely more complex than Hales 
describes. While intuition-driven and Christian philosophical practices may 
be basic, a person may, in fact, engage in both in a parallel manner in which 
one can engage in perceptual practice and religious practice together. If that 
is true, delineating when a practice is truly basic may be much more difficult 
than at first appears. A good deal of moral decisions may, in fact, be shared 
across aspects of the basic practices. 
Hales does mention one more purely metaphysical issue, namely, the 
soul, wherein secular and Christian folk are likely to disagree. But one can 
hardly capture the entirety of philosophical Christendom on this issue either. 
It is not entirely clear to many Christian philosophers whether there is an 
incorporeal soul.5 The doctrine of the resurrection of the body itself might 
give one pause here. While it is likely true that many Christian philosophers 
are substance dualists, certainly not all are. I am not, for one, at least on most 
days. I propose that although the percentages of those holding various views 
would be distributed differently, secular and Christian philosophers might 
have something close to the same number of different views on the nature 
of the mind or soul. After all, Plato was not a Christian and, if anything, the 
Christian church was influenced more by Plato than by scripture on this mat-
ter (in my opinion). 
One area where secular and Christian beliefs clearly conflict is over the 
issue of God's existence. Here we might find some more clear way of dis-
tinguishing the basic deliverances of Christian versus intrinsic-driven epis-
temic practices. One presumes, according to Hales's view, that the proposi-
tion "God exists and is the loving creator of the universe" will be true in the 
Christian perspective but false in the secular rationalist perspective. This is, 
of course, a large issue not be handled in a few paragraphs. I will, nonethe-
less, provide a brief set of suggestions for consideration. 
Before making my suggestions, it should be noted that Hales assumes 
that I am critical of his argument because I am an absolutist about truth. 
Hales has, in fact, no evidence for this assumption. That I think his argument 
for relativism fails does not entail that relativism is not true. In fact, I hold a 
largely relativist position, more extensive, in some ways, than Hales's view. 
Having noted that important caveat, I can now point out that Hales spends 
some time in his book and in other places6 rejecting relativisms based in 
conceptual schemes and defends his propositional cum epistemic perspec-
tive. I take a conceptual scheme approach, inspired by Nelson Goodman and 
Michael Lynch. However in my approach God's existence is not dependent, 
strictly speaking, on any human noetic structure. God is, to use Lynch's ter-
minology, a "virtual absolute" that is, something that exists (or a proposition 
that is true) in every conceptual scheme but independent of none. I then 
suggest that human conceptual schemes interact with the divine conceptual 
scheme in which God's being obtains. I will not take the time to defend all 
5. See, e.g., Kevin Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative 
to the Soul (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006). 
6. See Hales, "Lynch's Metaphysical Pluralism," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 63 (2001): 699-709. 
that here but interested readers might peruse my essays noted below/ With 
this very brief notation as a back drop, I propose the following problem with 
Hales's account of relativism. 
In general, as a Christian theist, I find something deeply odd about 
Hales's view. In particular I find curious the result that the statement "God 
exists" (or any of a host of other theistic claims entailing that God exists) is 
true only in religious doxastic perspectives. To get at this curiosity, suppose 
some well-known senior philosopher, immersed deeply in the intuition-driv-
en analytic rationalism in which Hales finds his philosophical home, reaches 
the well-thought out conclusion that solipsism is true. That, of course, is a 
philosophical position the vast majority of other philosophers would reject. 
However, according to Hales's view, from the solipsistic perspective, there 
are no other philosophers, really. My moral is not far to seek, namely, even 
if relativism holds, some philosophical propositions seem to withstand the 
noetic machinations of philosophers (whether conceptual or epistemic). It 
just does not seem likely that because some solipsistic philosopher comes to 
hold that there are no other people that there are no other people--conceptual 
scheme or epistemic perspective notwithstanding. While some philosophical 
propositions are what we might call limitedly relative (relative to only some 
schemes, perspectives, and so on), others are instead virtually absolute. On 
Hales's account, they would be true in each and every perspective but inde-
pendent of none. This does not make them absolute-that is, independent 
of every perspective-but virtually absolute-true in every perspective, in-
dependent of none. I propose that the proposition "humans exist" and the 
proposition that "God exists" are two such propositions. Here, thus, is the 
oddity of how I think Hales would have to treat the solipsistic philosopher. 
Here, too, is the curiosity I find in what I think would be Hales's treatment 
of the central deliverance of the Christian epistemic practice, namely, God 
exists. Furthermore, given the Christian understanding of God, God too is a 
being with noetic influence on the ways the world is-a very important one, 
in fact. Just as the solipsistic philosopher cannot so easily do away with other 
humans via epistemic or conceptual perspective, neither can the secular in-
tuition-driven relativist so easily do away with God. Some things must fall 
outside the influence of human noetic workings. A totalizing relativism is, 
as Alston points out, problematic.8 The only question is, what falls outside 
human noetic influence? I propose that, at God's core being, God does. Nev-
7. See my Make/Believing the World(s): Toward a Christian Ontological Pluralism (Mon-
treal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2009); "Epistemizing the Worlds: A Reply to Gregory 
E. Ganssle," Philosophia Christi 8 (2006): 439-51; and "Rejoinder to Ganssle's Real Problems 
with Irrealism," Philosophia Christi 8 (2006): 459-61; along with "The Many Ways God Is," 
Forum Philosophicum (forthcoming), and "God and (Nearly) Universal Pluralistic Antireal-
ism," Polish Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming). 
8. See William Alston, A Sensible Metaphysical Realism (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 2001), and my "God and (Nearly) Universal Pluralistic Antirealism." 
ertheless, because God is involved in conceptual schemes alongside humans 
and indeed is the creator of humans, God is relative to all human schemes. 
But for a defense and further explanation of that, the reader will have to look 
elsewhere. 
I mentioned that Hales's takes me to be an absolutist about truth. In fact, 
I simply do not think one should get to a relativist view via his epistemic ar-
gument and I do not think Hales succeeds in so doing. This makes a number 
of his comments and responses irrelevant to my own view of these matters. I 
did say in my earlier essay that I am not inclined to take a skeptical way out 
of the problem of incommensurable doxastic practices.9 I am still not. How-
ever, my tweaking of Alston's way out notes only that it seems less rational 
to leap to relativism than it does to admit that one does not know that one's 
assumed path to knowledge is an actual path to knowledge. As I noted, the 
Alston-type of response leads to some philosophical discomfort. However, 
this is not just some academic hangnail but rather making a difficult choice 
between two hard options. On the one hand, I might have gone deeply astray 
(whoops, Christianity is false, and I lie rotting in my grave someday!). On 
the other hand, Christianity is true, but only according to what my doxastic 
perspective provides for. Neither one of these is my first choice, but ifi have 
to make it, rationally I would say there is nothing superior about the second. 
Even if the Knower's Paradox were to result from skepticism, I might be 
inclined, rationally, to take that route rather than Hales's relativism-and I 
hold to a quite extensive relativism myself! It is not the relativism I am op-
posed to so much as Hales's version of it and the means by which he arrives 
there. 
Furthermore, Hales describes the Alston and McLeod-Harrison view as 
allowing one to "select randomly from an array of apparently equal belief-
forming methods and then remain convinced that this random selection will 
produce knowledge of the absolute truth."' 0 I doubt Alston would agree, 
and I certainly do not. Humans do not, typically, simply choose our doxastic 
practices, at least not so simply. If we could, I suppose my advice to Hales 
would be to switch doxastic practices quickly, for on the Christian view, 
there is an afterlife with God. On the secular view, there is not-just moldy 
bodies in graves. I would pick a doxastic view that is a little more suited to 
longevity, myself. But in fact, it is not so easy, as Pascal admits, even after 
his famous wager is laid out. One can choose to take holy water, but it might 
be some time before one's epistemic worldview is washed clean. 
One final but important response. Hales says that there are good logical 
reasons for not following me down the path suggesting that Hales's defense 
of philosophical relativism entails an epistemic account of truth. He writes: 
9. See McLeod-Harrison, "Hales's Argument for Philosophical Relativism," 421. 
I 0. Hales, "What to Do about Incommensurable Doxastic Practices," 204. 
Notice that he accepts the reasons that I provide as premises for my 
defense of relativism; it is just that he is not sufficiently convinced 
that relativism is preferable to skepticism. In the paragraph quoted 
above, McLeod-Harrison agrees with me that relativism is compatible 
with both an epistemic theory of truth and with nonepistemic theories; 
that is, it is not the case that relativism entails an epistemic theory. No 
problem so far. But McLeod-Harrison then adds his own contention 
that the reasons to accept relativism entail an epistemic account of 
truth. Unfortunately, adding this assumption results in an inconsis-
tency. Here is the proof. 
Let p = the reasons I give to accept relativism, q = relativism, and 
r = the epistemic theory of truth. 
( l) p primary assumption, defended by Hales, accepted 
by McLeod-Harrison 
(2) ~(q--+ r) primary assumption, defended by Hales, accepted 
by McLeod-Harrison 
(3)p--+r primary assumption, defended by McLeod-Har-
(4) ~(~qvr) 
(5) ~~q 1\ ~r 
(6) ~r 
(7) r 
(8) r A ~r 
rison 
2 implication 
4 DeMorgan's Law 
5 A elimination 
l, 3 modus ponens 
6, 7 1\ introduction 11 
His proof, however, is faulty, for his use of "p" in lines (1) and (3) are, I 
believe, equivocal. He says that I accept his reasons to accept relativism 
(his first "p"). But I do not. I accept as true that there is deep problem with 
apparently incommensurable doxastic practices. I do not accept that this is 
a reason to accept relativism. In line (3), he says I defend p--+r but the p 
here is richer than the p in line ( 1 ). My criticism is not of the claim that there 
are incommensurable doxastic practices. Rather my criticism, which leads 
to my claims about epistemic notions of truth, depends on using the fact of 
incommensurable doxastic practices as a reason to move to relativism. This 
is evidenced by the quotations from Hales's book I used (and will not repeat 
here) in "Hales's Argument for Philosophical Relativism."12 Hales cannot, I 
believe derive a contradiction the way he does. My position is that the way 
Hales goes with his defense and subsequent description of relativism, he 
is committed to an epistemic account of truth. I reject epistemic accounts 
of truth as, finally, not the best way to approach relativism. It simply gives 
human beings too much say in what is true. My approach is rather to sug-
gest that our epistemic practices fall out of the way we conceptualize the 
world(s). Hence, in the end, I am a lot more sanguine about accepting the 
doxastic cards we have been dealt. Indeed, on the grounds I lay out in my 
own version of relativism (building on observations from Nelson Goodman 
II. Ibid., 206. 
12. McLeod-Harrison, "Hales's Argument for Philosophical Relativism," 423. 
and Catherin Elgin),13 knowledge may be overrated. And if not overrated, 
perhaps we do not have it at all, if we take knowledge to entail knowing that 
we know. It is this sort of knowing that Hales's argument needs to work. 
Here I am skeptical. 
So in response to the topic "what to do about incommensurable perspec-
tives" I think I can say that there is nothing to do, and hence perhaps Hales's 
response really is much "to-do" about nothing. 
13. See, e.g., Nelson Goodman and Catherine Z. Elgin, "A Reconception of Philosophy," in 
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988). 
